We introduce a Paraconsistent Informational Logic that formalizes the idea of conjectures which are acceptable as to the quality and the variety of the information that they convey with respect to a given theory T, even if they are classically inconsistent with T. The work constitutes an extension of a previously developed Informational Logic for classical frameworks, where a new notion of logical entropy measure H on formulas and on proofs plays a central role.
Introduction
Informational Logic aims to build formal contexts suitable to approximate, from a proof-theoretic standpoint, the conjectures carried out by an epistemic agent T. We figure out that, to carry out this formulation of conjectures, the agent T, given a statement L, analyses the decisions about L produced by a powerful inferential environment , external to T. Then, T gives an estimate of the possibility of stating L through its own inference, by comparing its inferential capabilities with that of . On this basis, a T-acceptability grade to L is assigned, that expresses the closeness of L with respect to T. Such value is the result of the comparison between the theoretical information on L produced by the E-mail addresses: forcheri@ge.imati.cnr.it (P. Forcheri), gentilini@irre.liguria.it, gentilini@ge.imati.cnr.it (P. Gentilini).
environment and the estimate of the possible theoretical information on L that can be constructed by T. To develop a formal setting apt to represent this kind of reasoning, we work as follows. Let us suppose that a sentence L is proved by the deductive apparatus ded( ) by a proof P . Then, a formal conjecture based on L from the standpoint of T is given by a pair (L, p(L)) where p(L) is a measure of the probability of L to be provable using ded (T) . p(L) is the result of a syntactic comparison between the real proof P of L in and an estimate of a possible proof (virtual proof) of L in T. In order to produce this comparison we introduce a logical entropy measure H on proofs and axioms: H , which reflects the Shannon entropy measure (see [17, 24] ), expresses the qualitative aspects of the logical information included in a formal proof. The probability p(L) is computed as p(L) = H (Q)/H (P ), Q virtual proof of L in T, P suitable real proof of L in . Q is obtained via the definition of an estimate criterion CR T for the proofs in the system T. The estimate criterion for proofs in T requires suitable proof-theoretic properties both of T and , which are expressed by the notion of regular logical calculus RK and regular theory T = RK + AxT, AxT proper axiom set. An informational context is therefore a setting ( , AxT, RK, CR T , H ) where informational theorems (L, p(L)) are produced. We refer to [13] [14] [15] [16] , for the results already obtained as to classical settings. We limit ourselves to underline that in classical informational contexts and T are mutually consistent, and then the standard conjectures have a conservative character with respect to T.
Here, the above outlined ideas will be discussed with reference to paraconsistent settings. In particular, we provide the proof-theoretical results that allow the extension of informational logic to a family of paraconsistent systems essentially given by the Csystems. The C-systems (see Carnielli-Marcos [7] [8] [9] ) are paraconsistent systems allowing to formalize consistency and inconsistency statements by introducing a new monadic connective • , so that • B has the intended meaning "B is consistent". We prove that suitable predicate logic sequent formulations of the C-systems are possible, that have the regularity properties required to support an informational context, thus allowing to obtain C-informational contexts (Definition 18) where conjectures on formal consistency and inconsistency can be generated. Moreover, since in a predicate logic setting the Provability Logic predicates Pr V referring to any recursively axiomatized system V can be introduced, we may define contexts in which conjectures on consistency both from a local standpoint (i.e. centred on specific formulas) and from a global standpoint (i.e. referring to a theory) are simultaneously expressible.
Some external affinities between informational logic and uncertainty logics, possibilistic logics, fuzzy logic (e.g., Dubois [11] , Kyburg [25] ), formal logical investigations of probability (e.g., Halpern [23] , Montagna [28] , Scott-Krauss [33] ) may be noted. However, we have to point out the deep difference with respect to our approach. The probability measure presented in Information Logic does not have a semantic foundation and does not reflect any uncertainty or vagueness of the epistemic state of the rational agent or of the given knowledge basis. Informational theorems (B, p(B) ) are such that p(B) is a probability of the provability of B in a given system T, obtained through proof-theoretically based estimate criteria and logical information measures on the syntax of the real and virtual proofs on which we work. Thus, the informational theorem or formal conjecture (B, p(B) ) is closer to an active proof process than to a vague knowledge assumption. A connection between the notion of probability of a proposition and its provability is pro-posed by Pearl in [30] ; however, such approach is different since the notion of provability employed there has not a proof-theoretical foundation. As to the foundations and developments of the Paraconsistent Logic framework we refer to Batens et al. [1] , Carnielli et al. [6] , Da Costa [10] . As to the formalization of consistency and inconsistency statements through the C-systems we refer to the founding works of Carnielli-Marcos [5, [7] [8] [9] . As to the formalization of global consistency and inconsistency statements about theories we refer to the work on Provability Logic by Boolos [2] , Gentilini [18] [19] [20] , Smorynski [34] , Solovay [35] . We note that [18] is a seminal work with respect to the notion of formal conjecture of Informational Logic, since in it a mathematical notion of distance between a sequent and a system is introduced.
The Gentzen formulation of predicate logic systems
In this section we recall the sequent version LK of the classical predicate calculus and some sequent formulated paraconsistent systems existing in the literature. Our references for the general properties of the sequent calculi will be [4, 18, 21, 36, 37] S , the sequents S 1 , . . . , S n are the premises of the rule, the sequent S is the conclusion of the rule. The proofs are trees, whose leaves are axioms and whose branches are formed by sequent rules. In a proof-tree P a branch is a maximal linearly ordered set of sequents in it, having an axiom as the first element, where each sequent is a premise of the successive sequent. We also use the writings ∧X, ∨Y to indicate the conjunction (respectively disjunction) of the elements of X (respectively Y ). We call the formula ∧X → ∨Y positive translation of the sequent X Y . The writing Λ, Γ stands for Λ ∪ Γ . If X ⊂ Λ and Y ⊂ Γ we say that X Y is a sub-sequent of Λ Γ . The size size(S) of a sequent S is the number of symbol occurrences in it. As to the definition of the set of subformulas of a given formula B, we specify that a strictly syntactic definition is used here for the subformulas of a quantified formula; that is, for example, if we have ∃x∀yA(x, y), A predicate letter, the subformula set is {A(x, y), ∀yA(x, y), ∃x∀yA(x, y)}; moreover, subformulas of a given B that differ only by uniform renaming of bound variables are identified. In this exposition, for the sake of brevity, we will examine predicate calculi without the axioms for the equality predicate = (., .).
A theory T based on a sequent calculus W is given by the deduction apparatus of W plus a (possibly empty) proper axiom set AxT expressed by sequents. We also write W + AxT for T. The proofs of T are trees of sequents; the theorems of T are the roots of the trees. We also say that a formula A is a theorem of T if the sequent A is a theorem of T. A theory T is trivial if it proves each sequent of the form A. T is paraconsistent if any formula B exists such that T plus B ∧ ¬B is a non-trivial theory. We say that a set U of sequents trivializes T, and that T is trivializable by U, if T + U results as a trivial theory.
The sequent version LK of the classical predicate calculus is as follows: Definition 1. We say that a sequent formulated predicate calculus W having the same structural rules as LK admits of the estimate criterion CR for proofs if, fixed any language with at most a finite set of function symbols and individual constants, given a sequent L, given a bound k for the number of symbol occurrences in the terms (complexity of the terms), given a bound η for the number of formula occurrences in a sequent (width of the sequents), given a fixed finite sets of variables V ≡ {b 1 , . . . , b m }, 1 CR is an effective procedure which produces, from the input (L, k, η, m):
(i) An estimate of the axiom set of a possible W-proof Q of L which respects the bounds k, η and m, that is a finite set {S j } of W-axioms such that, if some cut-free W-proofs of L within the bounds k, η and m exist, the axiom set of at least one of them is a subset of {S j }; (ii) An estimate of the set of the logical rule instances of a possible W-proof Q of L which respects the bounds k, η and m, that is a finite set {I r } of W-logical rules instances such that, if some cut-free W-proofs of L within the bounds k, η and m exist, the logical rule set of at least one of them is a subset of {I r }; (iii) An estimate of the length l(Q) of a possible W-proof Q of L which respects the bounds k, η and m, that is an upper bound λ for the highest number of proof lines in a branch such that, if some cut-free W-proofs of L within the bounds k, η and m exist, at least one of them has each branch shorter than λ.
We call k, η and m the parameters of a CR-estimate.
Therefore, the estimate criterion CR is an effective procedure that, given L, k, η and m produces the mentioned estimate of a possible W-proof Q of L. Fixed CR and the input (L, k, η, m), it exists an unique estimated Q. Note that we do not impose that a real W-proof of L must exist. We remark that, in general, if W would include also the axiomatization of the equality predicate = (., .), then the condition "cut-free proof" must be changed into "proof containing at most atomic cuts" and this is the case of the calculus EQ in [13, 16] .
In general, fixed W, many estimate criteria may be definable. To discharge those CR's which produce redundant estimated sets of values, we introduce the following notion, that allows in principle a mathematical distinction between significant and not relevant criteria: Definition 2. Let W be a sequent predicate calculus as in Definition 1 above, where any language with at most a finite set of function letters and individual constants has been fixed. Let L be a W-provable sequent and let {P i (L)} be the set of the W-
} be the sets of the corresponding estimates, fixed L and the estimate parameters k, η and m. Let 
where . is the euclidean norm.
Intuitively, a most efficient criterion is such that, for the W-provable sequents, it produces an axiom set, a rule set, and a length bound value that are in some sense minimal, compatibly with its effectiveness (in general recursive procedures such that, for each L,
are produced, may not exist, as in Section 3.1 is discussed). The notion suggests a strategy for a proof-theoretic research that has to select significant concrete criteria.
About the proposed concept of estimate criterion at least two further points must be discussed: (a) the dependence of the estimated proof on the parameters k, η, m; (b) the fact that, in the informational logic framework, the CR-estimate is relevant even if the fixed sequent L is not W-provable. We will examine such items in Section 3.1, after the presentation of the essential notions of the informational logic framework. Note that the negation rule set of a regular paraconsistent RPK cannot include the classical one.
We also need estimate criteria for proofs in a theory T based on RPK. Then, it is necessary to introduce a notion of normal proof in a RPK-theory T, and this cannot be founded on cut-elimination. In a number of relevant theories based on a predicate calculus W, cuts cannot be eliminated: for example, the infinite arithmetical theories ranging between Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA and Peano Arithmetic PA do not admit of cut-elimination (see, e.g., [4, 21] ). However, for a number of them, a normal form for proofs is definable and a normal form theorem can be given, as e.g. is shown in [16] . The normality condition we adopt will be based on the distribution of the rules in the tree: , possibly universally closed, of the sequents N j ; (ii) R has U as the uppermost segment followed by a lower segment where each B j in the U -root is deleted by a cut.
We say that R is a normal T-proof of L.
Definition 5.
Let T ≡ RPK + AxT be a paraconsistent theory having a language with at most a finite set of function letters and individual constants and such that each T-proof admits of a normal form. Then, we say that T admits of the estimate criterion CR T for proofs if CR T is an effective procedure defined as CR in Definition 1, with the following specifications:
(a) "cut free W-proof" is replaced by "normal T-proof"; (b) as to the axiom set of a possible T-proof Q of a given sequent L, CR T estimates the set of the proper T-axioms occurring in Q, and it does not consider the possible RPK axioms occurring in Q. 2 Given the set {CR u T } of the estimate criteria for proofs in T, a most efficient criterion CR z T is defined as in Definition 2. We note that the calculus RPK may admit of an estimate criterion CR and, however, a RPK-based theory T may exist that does not have any estimate criterion for proofs.
From an informational standpoint the proper axiom set AxQ ⊂ AxT of a T-proof Q of a sequent L which is not a RPK-theorem plays a very important role, since it represents the specific information that is added to RPK in order to obtain L. Therefore, we refute the estimate criteria that produce a trivial estimate of the proper axiom set, that is: Then, we say that CR T is acceptable if the estimated proper axiom set {N j } is not the closure in the T-language of the sequent set AxT under the parameters k, η, m; CR T is not acceptable otherwise.
Conditions (a) and (b) are imposed in order to avoid the trivial cases (e.g., the case where L is exactly the AxT-closure under k, η, m of AxT, or L has in the succedent the conjunction of all the formulas of the AxT-closure under k, η, m, and so on). For some classes of theories, the properties of the T-language and of the T-axioms may allow estimate criteria CR T whose output does not depend on the parameters k, η, m: Definition 7. We say that a criterion CR T is stable if, for each sequent L, the CR T -estimates do not depend on the parameters k, η, m. CR T is essentially stable if the CR T -estimated proper axiom set does not depend on the parameters k, η, m.
We shall see in Section 4 that at least one essentially stable CR T exists.
Definition 8.
A theory T ≡ RPK + AxT having a language with at most a finite set of function letters and individual constants is a regular paraconsistent theory if:
(i) RPK is a regular paraconsistent calculus, AxT is a recursive set and T is paraconsistent; (ii) The T-proofs can be reduced to a normal form and T admits of an acceptable estimate criterion CR T for proofs.
In Section 4 is explicitly presented (Definition 17) the acceptable estimate criterion for the proofs in theories T that are based on the regular paraconsistent calculus BC. Acceptable estimate criteria for proofs of theories based on the equational predicate calculus EQ are presented in [13, 16] .
Definition 9 (Logical entropy measure of a formula).
Given a regular paraconsistent predicate calculus RPK, the quantity of information or logical entropy H of formulas and sequents is so defined:
(i) If A is an atomic formula of RPK, in which terms t 1 , . . . , t n occur, then:
number of occurrences of t i in A)/(number of occurrences of terms in A).
(ii) If B is a compound formula of RPK and {B 1 , . . . , B m } is the set of subformulas of B, where subformulas which differ only by uniform renaming of variables are identified, then:
, where: 
. . , S n } is a set of sequents, then H (S) = i H (S i ).
We wish to emphasize that the measure H cannot be replaced by more usual measures of complexity, of depth, and so on. Let us consider the following example: (x) ). In human knowledge it is self-evident that the information wealth of A is greater than that of B. Nevertheless, if we employ as parameter the complexity k = highest number of symbol occurrences in a term or the depth d = highest length of a decomposition tree of a term, we have:
. Conversely, the entropy measure H gives: H (A) = 1.386 > H (B) = 1.098. That is: a formula A may have greater entropy than that of a formula B with greater complexity and greater depth.
Definition 10 (Logical entropy measure of a proof ). Let P be a normal proof of a sequent L in RPK + AxT, RPK regular paraconsistent calculus. The logical entropy H (P ) of the proof P is:
H (I r ) = H (premises of I r ) − H (conclusion of I r ) , where:
-{A i } is the set AxP of proper axiom instances occurring in P ; -{I r } is the set I P of rule occurrences in P that introduce a logical symbol. We also write H (I P ) for r H (I r ).
We wish to comment briefly the entropy measures on formulas and proofs. First, we remark that it is an extension to a formal logical setting of the entropy measure of Shannon's Information Theory [17, 24] . The entropy of a set of formulas measures, from a syntactic standpoint, the quality and the variety of the logical information enclosed, and disregards the merely quantitative or combinatorial aspects of the complexity of the formula. The example presented above is simple, but it illustrates clearly entropy as a quality oriented measure at the syntactic level. Moreover, the notion is founded on a parallel between axioms and proofs in Proof Theory and sources and channels in Information Theory. Thus, a set of formulas is always considered as the potential information input of a proof, and the entropy measure stresses this aspect. Following such parallel, the entropy measure of a proof has to emphasize the transformation power of the proof with respect to its information input. A wider discussion on the motivations of the syntactic entropy measure is presented in [13] . Definition 11. We call paraconsistent informational context a 5-tuple ( , AxT, RPK, CR T , H ) such that:
is a non-trivial undecidable system extending T, such that the proof-theoretic strength (possibly expressed by ordinal measures: see [21, 36, 37] ) of is greater than that of T. Moreover, may be non classically consistent with T; (iii) CR T is an acceptable estimate criterion for proofs in T; (iv) H is a logical entropy measure.
The most important mathematical notion which represents a rational intuition in the conjecture formulation process is that of virtual proof: Definition 12 (A priori virtual proof ). Let L be a sequent in the language of a regular paraconsistent theory T ≡ RPK + AxT. Let CR T be an acceptable estimate criterion for proofs in T and let k, η, m be any fixed estimate parameters. Then, we call a priori virtual proof of L in T (or a priori virtual T-proof of L) the 4-tuple: (AxQ, I Q , H (Q), l(Q)), where:
-AxQ is the set of proper axiom instances of the CR T -estimated normal T-proof of L; -I Q is the set of rules introducing logical symbols of the
We also write Q for the 4-tuple (AxQ, I Q , H (Q), l(Q)) and Q(k, η, m) to indicate explicitly the dependence on the parameters.
Virtual T-proofs of L are independent of the existence of real T-proofs of L. They are mathematical objects, since CR T is an effective procedure representable by a recursive function. Moreover, since CR T is an acceptable criterion, the virtual proofs cannot have a merely combinatorial nature. We remark that, fixed the criterion CR T , given the parameters k, η, m, the virtual T-proof of L is unique, even if many criteria may exist. Different criteria CR T 's give rise to different informational contexts based on the same T, RPK, H . Several questions arise about the notion of virtual proof. The main one is the following: what is the meaning of the virtual T-proof of L in the cases in which L is not a T-theorem? We discuss this point in Section 3.1.
Definition 13 (Probability function for the T-provability).
Let Π ≡ ( , AxT, RPK, CR T , H ) be a paraconsistent informational context. Let L be a sequent in the language of T, so that a real known proof P of L in exists. Let [P ] be the set of the -proofs of L. Let Q(k, η, m) be the above defined a priori virtual proof of L in T. Let H ([P ]) be the value min R∈[P ] {H (R)}. Then, we call probability function for the T-provability of L in the context Π the function:
We remark that each time CR T is a stable criterion we have
a unique probability value.
If the context Π is defined in order to produce applicative results in any automated deduction environment, it may be convenient to study the probability of L to be provable in T through the properties of the function p (k, η, m) [L] of the estimate parameters, i.e. essentially as a measure depending on a sequence {Q n } of virtual proofs (see, for example, [15, 16] ). If the context Π is considered as the formalization of an epistemic environment and T is intended as an agent formulating conjectures, then we assume that proofs in T must have a constructive character with respect to the proofs in . We suppose that such constructive feature is lost if the proof size exceeds some exponential bound γ with respect to the complexity of L and of the T-language, and then it is assumed that the estimated virtual proofs Q(k, η, m) are not relevant if k, η, m are greater than γ : Definition 14. Let Π ≡ ( , AxT, RPK, CR T , H ) be a paraconsistent informational context and let ξ ≡ number of function letters and individual constants in the T-language. Then, we call constructive bound for virtual proofs of L in Π the number:
) be as in Definition 13 above. Then, we call probability of L to be provable in T in the context Π the number:
where H (Q * ) is the mean value:
being . the euclidean norm and γ (L, T) the constructive bound for virtual proofs. We
e. a constant probability value.
In the following, we will refer to (L, p(L)) also with the expression "formal conjecture" with respect to T. We will also write briefly p(L) for p (k, η, m) [L] when the dependence on k, η, m is not relevant for the discourse.
Problems and discussions
(I) As to estimate criteria and estimate parameters, first, we wish to examine the dependence of estimate criteria CR and CR T on the estimate parameters k, η, m that, in general, may be arbitrarily established. Indeed, for some interesting classes of theories, the normal form theorems for proofs can be so strong that provide CR-and CR T -outputs which are essentially independent of the estimate parameters. However, let us consider the most general case in which the CR-or CR T -output depends on the parameters k, η, m. We ask whether such dependence reflects the fact that the notion of estimate criterion is a weak notion, or if it expresses some essential limitative result of mathematical logic. We answer that it is a consequence of the undecidability of the full predicate logic and of many predicate logic based theories T having a deep mathematical meaning (PRA, PA and their subsystems, weak subsystems of second order Arithmetic, and so on, see [21, 34, 37] ). As remarked in [3] , we note that the parameters linked to the size of proofs "are important because they provide a measure of the difficulty of proving a given formula in a given formal system". But here is an important limitative result proven in [3] : the λ-provability problem for a first 
H ). Such approach produces the definition of informational theorem (L, p(L)) of Π (Definition 15).
A crucial question could be the following: if the predicate calculus or the theory T admit cut-free proofs, why proof estimates independent of the size parameters k, η, m are in general not possible? Also the negative answer to such problem lies on the undecidability of the full predicate logic: the standard sequent calculi for predicate logic (the classical LK, the intuitionistic LJ, the linear LL [22] , the paraconsistent WG n [32] ) admit of cut-elimination, but they are undecidable. A fundamental reason is that the classical subformula property of a cut-free proof is a poor tool in order to face the very difficult problem imposed by the fact that a cut-free proof P of a sequent L may contain arbitrarily complex terms which do not occur in the root L. This is due to the deletion power of the quantifier rules. For example, in a cut-free proof we may have the premise A(t (r 1 , . . . , r n )) of a ∃−R rule having ∃xA(x) as the conclusion; the arbitrarily complex term occurrence t (r 1 , . . . , r n ) is deleted. Analogously, we may have, in a cut-free proof P of L, a sequent S of the form A(r 1 ), . . . , A(r n ), n arbitrarily high, that, through n ∃−R rules, gives rise to a lower sequent of the form ∃xA(x); in this way, the width n of the sequent S is deleted. Therefore: the parameters k, η depend on the term complexity problem for proofs, which has a central role in producing the undecidability of predicate logic. We must moreover emphasize that it is not possible to avoid complex terms in order to obtain theories having a real mathematical expressive power, and reflecting the mathematical practice (consider e.g. the Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA whose terms express all the primitive recursive functions and procedures).
(
II) As to virtual proofs, a fundamental question is the following: what is the meaning of the CR-or CR T -output in the case in which the given sequent L is not RPK-provable or not T-provable? Such question naturally involves also the notion of a priori virtual proof, that is: what is the meaning of the a priori virtual T-proof Q of L if L is not T-provable ?
We preliminarily observe that, even if a real T-proof of L does not exist, the a priori virtual T-proof Q of L in the context is a defined mathematical object. Then, a first answer is that we are interested in establishing a metric between a sequent L and a given system or theory, based on the logical information measures. That is, the non T-provable sequents do not have the same status with respect to T: they are characterized by the quantity of specific information that must be added to T in order to prove them. Thus, as a preliminary result, we are satisfied if the CR T -estimated a priori virtual T-proof of L contains any information that, suitably employed, allows formal measures of the distance between L and T. And this happens by the comparison with the -proofs of L through the notion of syntactic probability p(L) in the informational context. Q produces through p(L) a contiguity or pertinence measure of L with respect to T. A formal notion of distance between a sequent and a system has been already introduced in [18] in order to prove the arithmetical completeness of modal logic. Moreover, from a different perspective, we may note that the a priori virtual proof Q also acquires a semantic role, in the sense of a constructive semantic a la Brower-Heyting: Q can be seen as a constructive meaning of L with respect to T, and p(L) becomes a kind of intuitionistic truth value of L in the fixed context. However, the question above has been only postponed. We can formulated it again in the following form: is p(L) a well-founded and efficient expression of the distance between L and T? And, moreover, is it a useful notion?
(III) Let us examine the theoretical and applicative meanings of Informational Contexts and probability functions. The question must be referred to the whole informational context Π ≡ ( , AxT, RPK, CR T , H ) in which p(L) is computed, either as probability function (Definition 13) or as probability value (Definition 15). The underlying philosophy of the informational context, both in the classical and in the paraconsistent cases, is the following: proofs in of a given L are shorter and less constructive than that in T. Then, we suppose that the computational costs of the -proofs of L are low, but the rules and axioms which are employed correspond to exacting mathematical and logical (and perhaps ontological) commitments. Conversely, we suppose that the T-proofs of L may be longer and with weaker axioms, corresponding to weaker mathematical (and perhaps epistemological, ontological) assumptions. The relationship between and T in an informational context in some sense reproduces the one between classical and constructive mathematics. Many mathematical statements may not have complicated classical proofs (e.g., by the excluded middle principle) but it is not simple to establish if they have constructive proofs too, and possibly to write them. On the other hand, the proofs in may be considered as "easy" in the sense that they may have a little size, but also as "complicated" in the sense that they may employ non-evident infinitary assumptions. After this, the reliability of p(L) depends on a reasonable choice for and T: T must admits of an efficient normal form theorem for proofs allowing a well-founded estimate criterion CR T ; a comparison theory for the proofs of and T must be established, in order to obtain the measures H (R) of a T-proof R and H (P ) of a -proof P of L as homogeneous (and then, possibly, comparable) measures; minimality conditions for a -proof of a given L must be defined. An example of such treatment for the Inductive Informational Contexts (i.e., briefly, contexts where T is an induction free theory and is endowed by induction over N) is presented in [13, 15, 16] .
If these requirements are satisfied, we can say that the ratios H (Q(k, η, m))/H ([P ]) or H (Q * )/H ([P ]) essentially express the quantity of information that T lacks in order to
prove L. The dependence on k, η, m in the functional expression tells us that our knowledge of this information gap will be meaningful only if we have at disposal a reliable estimate criterion. Each time we can conclude that such ratios are small (as to the functional expression this implies that the function H (Q(k, η, m) ) is bounded) we can say that the probability that L is T-provable is small, and even that the distance (possibly we may think to such distance as
) between L and T is high. The name probability is justified by the fact that the selection of the criterion CR T and of the estimate parameters cannot be done through an effective (recursive) method. Having established the well foundedness of the notion of syntactic probability p(L), we have to discuss its utility. We shall consider (i) a theoretical use and (ii) an applicative use. 
, presumably, p(Con(RA)) > p(Con(PRA)) p(Con(PA))).
Observe that it would be not simple to formalize the epistemological difference among the three statements through semantical tools: all three are true in (a suitable expansion of) the standard model of RA. Then, Con(PRA) is a more reliable conjecture than Con(PA) for the agent T, and in a possible reasoning on conjectures the different reliability grades must be taken into account.
Observe, moreover, that in this case the estimate criterion CR RA and the computation of the a priori virtual RA-proofs must be applied to sentences which are not RA-provable. In fact, the example above allows us also to emphasize a fundamental property of the informational contexts: even if T B, the epistemic subject T cannot know that it does not prove B; indeed, by Gödel theorems, no T can prove ¬Pr T ( B ), 4 whatever B is. Therefore, for example, the above considerations on the non RA-provability of the sentences Con(RA), Con(PRA), Con(PA) belong to the metatheory about the context, and cannot never be formulated by T ≡ RA. Then, all three sentences may be only proper conjectures from the standpoint of T, which may apply to them the effective estimate procedure at disposal.
(ii) Let us consider the applicative use of the syntactic probability measure. Such use is exemplified in [16] for the automated deduction in the inductive informational contexts, but the approach may be in principle generalizable. Indeed, the notions of syntactic probability and of informational context have been originated by the following problem: given a theory T and a sequent L, to find a non-standard (implementable) decision method in order to establish if L is T-provable, without necessarily proving L in T. It is assumed that the computational costs of the possible T-proof of L are high, while the automated deduction apparatus may efficiently produce proofs of L in a suitable T-extension . In order to produce such decision theory the syntactic probability must be studied as a probability function p(k, η, m) [L] : considering the CR T -output CR T (L, k, η, m) as a function of the parameters k, η, m, a sequence {Q n } of a priori virtual T-proofs of L can be produced. Moreover, introducing a suitable notion of sequence expansion of a proof P in it is possible to generate a sequence {P n } of -proofs of (suitable instances of) L. Thus, we can consider also the sequence p n of the entropy ratios H (Q n )/H (P n ). The study of the properties of p n and of other information measure sequences computed on Q n , P n , allows to obtain the searched decision criteria.
A proof-theoretical analysis of the C-systems
In this section we introduce a predicate sequent version BC of the paraconsistent basic logic of formal inconsistency bC defined in Carnielli-Marcos [7] . In a predicate logic environment we call local consistency or inconsistency sentence each sentence including formulas of the form • B, ¬(A ∧ ¬A), B ∧ ¬B as subformulas. The interest of the notion is also given by the fact that it may interact with a notion of global consistency or inconsistency statement, referring to any recursively axiomatized system V, through the provability predicate Pr V (.) (see [2, 18, 34] ). For example, in a predicate logic environment we can study either classical consistency statements of the form ¬Pr V ( A ∧ ¬A ) or formulas Pr V+B ( A ∧ ¬A ) ∧ ∃x¬Pr V+B (x) asserting the paraconsistency of V and of the theory V + B. Thus, predicate logic theories of the form BC + AxT can be the most expressive setting for the formalization of meta-reasoning about consistency and inconsistency, both in its global and its local aspects. Moreover, we will show that BC is a regular paraconsistent predicate calculus and that the predicate logic systems corresponding to the C-systems presented in [7] can be seen as regular paraconsistent theories. Thus, the local consistency or inconsistency statements studied by the C-systems extending bC, can be studied also as formal conjectures in the paraconsistent informational contexts based on BC. To this purpose, we must carry out a cut-elimination theorem for BC, and a set of proof-theoretical results that allow to establish the desired regularity properties for a relevant class of BC-based theories.
The calculus BC is defined as follows: axioms, positive propositional logical rules, quantifier rules, structural rules, are the same as in the calculus LK presented in Section 2; the negation rules are the followings:
We call the formula • A in the rule ¬−L3 constraint formula of the rule. It is well known that in bC and in the C-systems the connective • , having the intended meaning "A is consistent", is not definable starting from the other logical connectives. Moreover, we remark that in BC the axioms A A cannot be restricted to the atomic case only. For example, due to the constraints in ¬−L3, we cannot prove ¬A ¬A from A A in BC.
Proposition 3.
The system BC has exactly the same theorems of bC, provided that theorems X Y of BC are translated into formulas ∧X → ∨Y of the bC-language, and that a suitable standard translation of bC-formulas into sequents is assumed.
Proof. From [7] we know that bC is given by the minimal paraconsistent system C min plus the Gentle Principle of Explosion bc1:
It is obvious that BC proves the C min theorems. We establish that a sequent version of the principle bc1 is: • A, A, ¬A . Then, the following is the BC-proof of bc1:
It is known that BC minus ¬−L3 is a sequent version of C min [32] . Then, we have to show that BC minus ¬−L3 plus (bc1) proves each conclusion of a ¬−L3 rule. Indeed, let
• A,Γ ∆,A
• A,¬A,Γ ∆ be any ¬−L3 rule occurrence in a BC-proof; then, it can be replaced by the following cut:
In order to expose the cut-elimination theorem for BC we need to recall some notions of proof-theory: 5 Definition 16. (i) In a proof-tree P in BC the depth or height h(P ) is the highest number of proof-lines in a branch. The grade g(A) of a formula A is the number of occurrences of logical symbols in it.
(ii) In a rule occurrence R in a proof-tree P in BC we call: auxiliary formulas the formula occurrences in the premises on which the rule acts; principal formula, or formula introduced by the rule, the formula occurrence produced by the rule in the conclusion. Each formula in the conclusion of R is called the successor of the formulas in the premises corresponding to it, that are called its predecessors. In a branch of P we say that the formula occurrence B is an ancestor of the formula C occurring below B in the branch, called a descendant of B, if they are connected by a sequence of predecessor-successor relations alongside the branch. C is called an integral descendant of B if B and C are the same formula.
Theorem 1. Cut elimination holds for BC.
The proof is shown in Appendix A. At this point a question arises: does a sequent formulated predicate logic extension of the C-system Ci (see [7] ) exist, having the same regularity properties as BC? We believe that the answer is negative, since it seems to be very difficult to define cut-free sequent formulations of Ci which are not redundant, i.e. that do not include a lot of ad hoc rules. A sequent formulation of Ci is BC plus the axiom ¬ • A A ∧ ¬A. It is evident that such version cannot admit cut-elimination. But we also have the following general limitative result: Proof. Let us suppose ad absurdum that H exists. Then it must be consistent and has the sequent •• A as the root of a cut-free proof. But •• A in the root may be neither the principal formula of a weakening with the empty sequent as premise, nor the principal formula of any arbitrary negation rule, and in both cases we have an absurd. 2 Therefore, we prefer to consider the system Ci given by BC plus ¬ • A A ∧ ¬A as a regular paraconsistent theory based on BC. Then, it must be concluded the proof that BC is a regular paraconsistent predicate calculus that can support regular theories.
Proposition 5. BC is a regular paraconsistent predicate calculus.
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that given in [16] for the classical calculus LK. 2
Conversely, in order to characterize the regular paraconsistent theories based on BC, we must give specific proofs. Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that in AxT only sentences occur. Let U V be the root of a T-proof P . Lemma 1 allows us to replace each proper axiom occurrence X j Y j in P with the BC-proof having ∧X j → ∨Y j , X j Y j as end sequent. Then, after possible suitable renaming of free variables in the branches and possible eliminations of cuts, we obtain a cut-free proof P * in BC of the sequent {∧X j → ∨Y J }, U V , being {X j Y i } j ∈J the set of the proper T-axiom occurrences in P . Since the sequents ∧ X j → ∨Y j are T-theorems trivially provable from each proper axiom X j Y j , if we apply d suitable cuts starting from the root of P * , d = card(J ), we obtain a T-proof P * * of U V which is a normal T-proof, as defined in Definition 4. Moreover, by construction of the cut-free segment P * of P * * , each formula in {X j Y j } j ∈J can be obtained through a suitable term-replacement from a subformula of a formula occurring in U V . Then, given a sequent W Z, fixed the bounds k, η, and the variable set V ≡ {b 1 , . . . b m } as mentioned in Definitions 1 and 5, we can estimate the set of proper T-axiom occurrences in a possible normal T-proof Q of W Z as included in A, where A is the set of proper axiom instances ∆ r Π r such that: (i) they have formulas that can be obtained through a suitable term-replacement from a subformula of a formula occurring in W Z; (ii) they respect the bounds k, η; (iii) they include possible variables that range among b 1 , . . . , b m . Let n = card(A). Let G ≡ {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t s } be the set of terms in the T-language, with complexity k and variables ranging in V. Assuming that the possible T-proof Q of W Z is normal, we have that the greatest length of a branch in Q is n + card(E), where E is the set of the sequents of width η including formulas obtained from subformulas of formulas occurring in W Z by term-replacements with terms ranging among t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t s . E includes the sequents occurring in Q. The set of the logical rule occurrences in Q can be estimated as included in the set of the BC-logical rule instances having the principal formula that can be obtained through a suitable term-replacement from a subformula of a formula occurring in W Z, and their premises and their conclusion belonging to E. 2
The proof of Theorem 2 allows to define the following estimate criterion: Definition 17. Let T ≡ BC + AxT be a paraconsistent theory, AxT ≡ {X i Y i } i∈I recursive proper axiom set, having a language with at most a finite set of function letters and individual constants. Let L ≡ W Z and let k, η, m be the fixed estimate parameters. Then, the estimate criterion CR T is the following procedure, assuming the basic case where only sentences occur in AxT: We can also show that a relevant class of theories T ≡ BC + AxT having essential stable estimate criteria exists.
We say that a theory T is purely predicative if in the T-language function letters do not occur. Thus, it is possible to prove that: Proposition 7. Let T ≡ BC + AxT be a paraconsistent theory such that the T-language is purely predicative and with at most a finite number of individual constants, and such that in AxT only closed formulas occur. Then, T has an estimate criterion CR T which is essentially stable.
The interest of the result is due to the fact that, as it is known, many relevant theories can be reformulated in a purely predicative language: Example 2. Let AxT be the Peano axioms for arithmetical systems in the language {0, S(.), +(., .) · (., .), = (., .)}. Then, we can replace each term S(t) with t + 1 and then, as e.g., in [29] is proposed, the functions +(., .) · (., .) with two three-place predicates A(., ., .) and B(., ., .) respectively, such that, for example, any formula x + y = z is translated into A(x, y, z) and so on. AxT can be reformulated in the new language  {0, 1, A(., ., .) , B(., ., .), = (., .)}. The above defined context will be the basis for the introduction of a proof-theory acting on conjectures [12] . The paraconsistent informational contexts also acquire interesting epistemological corroborations. Starting from the consideration that inconsistencies occur in the construction processes of scientific theories (see, e.g., Meheus [26, 27] ), we show in [12] that the conjectural inference we propose may contribute to the logical characterization of the scientific discovery. Proof. We consider an uppermost cut C in a proof-tree P in BC and show that it can be replaced by BC-deductions without cuts. The proof is by induction on the cutrank with a subinduction on the level of C, that are so defined: the cutrank of C is the grade of the cut formula in C, the level of C is the sum of the depths of the deductions of the premises. Let C be the following cut in P :
Q1 Q2 Γ ∆, A A, Λ X Γ, Λ ∆, X ,
where Q1 and Q2 are the P -sub proofs of the premises. The only cases that we have to examine are the ones in which the cut formula A has either the form ¬B or the form • B.
As to the other cases, we refer to the cut elimination proofs for classical predicate calculus LK (see [21, 36, 37] ). We previously establish the following preliminary reductions on the tree P : if one of the cut-formulas of C has the form ¬B and is the descendant of the principal formula F of a weakening rule in P , we delete such weakening and each rule in P acting on a descendant of F , by getting a cut-free proof of a sub-sequent of Γ, Λ ∆, X; analogously, if the left cut formula of C has the form • B and is the descendant of the principal formula of a weakening rule, we delete such weakening, getting a cut-free proof of a sub-sequent of Γ, Λ ∆, X. After such preliminary reductions, we consider these different cases:
(1) At least one of Q1, Q2 is an axiom. Let the left premise be an axiom of the form A A. Then, the conclusion of C has the form: A, Λ X. Then, we replace C by the right premise. If the right premise is an axiom, we replace the cut by the left premise.
(2) Neither Q1 nor Q2 is an axiom and the cut formula is not principal in at least one of the premises. If the cut formula is not on the both sides principal, let us consider for example the premise Z W, A of the one-premise rule R in Q1 having the left cut premise Γ ∆, A as conclusion. Then we produce the following proof:
where the level of the introduced cut is lower than that of C, and the cutrank is the same. If R is a two-premise rule the reduction is similar, and so it is for the sub-cases in which the right cut formula is not principal, with the exception of the case in which A has the form • B and the right cut premise is the conclusion of a ¬−L3 rule K having • B as constraint formula. In this case let us consider the sub-proof Q1 of the left C-premise Γ ∆, • B in P . We observe that, by hypotheses, the occurrence of • B in such premise cannot be the principal formula of any rule in Q1 and then it must be introduced by a set of axiom occurrences of the form • B • B; moreover, it must be the integral descendant of the right formula of each axiom. If we replace each axiom occurrence by the proof of the C-premise • B, Λ X, we have a cut-free proof of Γ, Λ ∆, X, after possible suitable renaming of free variables in the branches. We observe that no (¬−L3)-rule constraints are broken in the reduction, since a • B in the succedent cannot be a constraint formula in any ¬−L3.
The cut formula is principal in both the premises of the cut C. If the cut formula has the form • B, then both the premises of the cut are the conclusions of weakening rules, and this case has already been solved by the preliminary reductions. Let us consider the cases in which the cut formula has the form ¬B. By hypotheses, both occurrences of ¬B are the principal formulas of negation rules.
(3.1) The left premise is the conclusion of a ¬−R rule and the right premise is the conclusion of a ¬−L1 rule: 
